Saturday, May 21, 2011

The Rise of China

I am not the only person who argues that U.S. hegemony has been steadily eroding for the past few decades. The question I posed at the end of my last post (what comes next?) is one that is frequently considered and debated by others. This usually occurs in the context of discussions about China. For China is seen as the most likely heir to the U.S. in its role as world superpower (whether this is viewed as a potential threat or an inevitability).

I do not believe that China, or even some East Asian regional block, will be the next hegemonic power. There are two primary reasons for my doubt:

1. China's economic development is based solely on strategic participation in the world market and manufacturing.

Strategic participation: Decades ago, when China was still considered a Third World country, it allied with the Soviet sphere of hegemony rather than that of the U.S. However, China also managed to maintain some distance and independence from the Soviet Union, so that it was never truly a member of the Soviet empire. As a result, China could protect itself against the types of neocolonial exploitation that ravaged other Third World nations (particularly those in the "free world.") When the growth of the world economy came to a screetching halt, China was perfectly poised to take advantage of the situation. Its ability to employ protectionist policies to limit imports and keep the exchange value of its currency low, among other things, has allowed China to develop its manufacturing sector and dominate foreign markets, despite a global crisis of overproduction. However, China succeeds in this regard only to the extent that everyone else fails. In the end, because China is dependent on foreign demand for its products and foreign investment, decrease in global demand and foreign debt crises threaten to undermine the stability of China's economic development.

Manufacturing: The profitability of Chinese manufacturing results from the cheap production costs enabled by protectionist policies and the persistent level of global demand for manufactured products (purposefully cultivated in an effort to ignite demand-driven economic growth). However, once again, this is short-term. In the long run, manufacturing, as it is currently organized socially, politically, logistically, and geographically, will never be able to overcome the crisis of overproduction that has been suffocating its ability to generate adequate rates of profit for decades. Thus, Chinese manufacturing will only be profitable for so long. It cannot overcome the crisis of overproduction.

2. Before the next world order emerges, substantial transformations of current political-economic structures will have to occur. This includes the geopolitical framework of the system of nation-states.  As the social/spatial/mechanical organization of production undergoes radical changes, so too will human geography and institutions such as states and transnational organizations (e.g. the UN).  The map may soon look drastically different.  Indeed, the chaos of multipolarity, which I discussed in my previous post, seems to prefigure such a change.  Thus, it does not make sense to look for the next superpower among the current collection of nation-states.  The answer to the the "What will come next?" question is something that does not yet exist.

China might be having a bit of a hey-day (though nothing that compares to its past splendor), but more in the form of a vulture feasting on a rotting carcass.

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