Clinton and Trump

Yes, I have not posted in a long time. I've been busier. I am also feeling more and more the repetitiveness of political/social drama and public discourse. Not only do I feel like I would be rehashing previous discussions, but it also drains the gas from my engine.

2016 is terrible, but as I am someone so clearly cynical about the inherent nature of political systems, the election is another area where my reactions would be easily predicted. There has been no dearth of fallacies, myths,and inaccuracies coming from all sides. It is infuriating. For some reason I decided it was time to weigh in on a few misconceptions.

Demagogues are responsible for bigotry. The best way to address bigotry is to discredit demagogues and defeat them at the polls by any means necessary.

This mode of thinking relies on a superhero view of the world where evil is something that exists in and of itself as a sine qua non of the order of the world. It is a characteristic of particular individuals who cannot be understood or changed, who are not rational beings, and are thus less than human. At the same time, this "evil" is treated like an infectious disease - it is contagious, it spreads, and it is capable of being incubated and exacerbated by malignant individuals - the demagogues. Bigotry follows this same pattern. Racists exist because... racists exist. They are, perhaps, a reflection of primordial human tendencies that some or most people have overcome. But the analysis is not as important as the public theater of denouncing them.

A sociological/anthropological analysis of racism stands in stark contrast to this moral-psychological view, with its understanding of society and systems and insistence on seeing all people. even the worst people, as nevertheless people - human beings with feelings and motives that can be at the very least understood. As I have mentioned before, the concept of race was developed as a means of channeling the anger of the white underclass in a direction that was not threatening to the dominating elites, as well as providing a moral justification for the oppression and/or extermination of non-white (black and native) populations. It has continued to serve this function. While neither race nor class is reducible to the other, they are at the same time very much interlinked. 

(Side note:  there is a parallel between the two analyses of bigotry and interpretations of terrorism. Some people see terrorists as irrational, not understandable, less-than-human, and terrorism as an aspect of the world that just is.  Their proposed solution to terrorism often involves a lot of violence. Others see terrorism as a phenomenon rooted in the domination of global capitalism and Western colonialism (this applies to domestic terrorism as well). They took seriously foreign terrorists' anger about the nature of U.S. involvement in other parts of the world and generally propose a radically different foreign policy as an important means of preventing terrorism. And they do this without justifying terrorism.)

If racism was birthed and maintained through economic exploitation and class conflict, then racism cannot significantly be addressed without altering the conditions of the political/economic system that sustains it. To that end, disregarding all of the concerns of that segment of the population to which racism is commonly considered endemic, is counter-productive to the goal of eradicating racism. I say "commonly considered" in part because I think there is a good case to be made that the elites perpetuate a subtle, yet vicious, form of racism that may be more damaging than that of certain blue collar whites. However, I think that particular issue is beyond the scope of this post.

This principle is applicable not just to Trumpism, but also, for example, to Brexit. If the people championing or indirectly supporting nationalism and bigotry are simultaneously aroused by feelings of anger related to economic opportunities and inequalities, eroding community bonds, and political disenfranchisement, then responding to these people by promoting policy that maintains or exacerbates these economic conditions (e.g. the type of policy represented by Clinton, the EU, and the British establishment), by explicitly demeaning and devaluing these people (calling them uneducated, ignorant, naive, incapable of acting in their own best interest), and by affirming their sense of helplessness in a political system that does not represent them (citing Trump or Brexit as a case that democracy is dangerous, advocating means of overriding the popular vote, telling third party voters that their vote only counts in relation to (for or against) one of the two main party candidates), one is actively promoting the conditions in which nationalism/racism/bigotry thrive.

The most constructive things a person can do are any actions that promote systemic change and a more open and representative political process. By this measure, voting for Hillary Clinton is not constructive.

Feeling that one can refrain from voting for Clinton is a form of privilege, as it indicates that one does not personally fear the consequences of a Trump presidency.

There is nothing I dislike more than social justice concepts such as "privilege" being used for base political ends. As a general rule, I am also incredibly frustrated by people who complain that "political correctness" is used to silence people who think differently. I have already written about what a disingenuous argument that is. In this case, however, this particular invocation of "privilege" is used to silence people who genuinely care about inequality (the argument is certainly not directed at conservatives) and this fact makes it all the more frustrating.

Recently I witnessed a female friend completely disregard the thoughts of a male who had just outlined the basis for his support of Jill Stein with the assertion that, as a man, he did not have to fear the consequences of a Trump presidency, and she thereby invalidated his choice to support Stein. I responded to her by pointing out that she had the privilege of not having to worry about the consequences of Clinton's foreign policy on the safety of either herself or her friends and family. I noted that I have heard Muslims and people with Middle Eastern and Latin American background/connections express such a personal fear. She ignored this point.

This could turn into a much longer discussion, but I will try to remain brief. Of course, it is important to take into account the experiences, observations, and social/historical perspectives of different people, most especially those who have not traditionally had a voice. But, being open and taking this into account, one must still formulate a set of principles and determine one's own positions based on those principles. Someone can validly assert that your arguments are based on fallacies, historical and sociological inaccuracies, a lack of evidence, and a disregard for others' experiences. A person can also validly link your personal position in society with such weaknesses in your arguments. But that is different than someone ignoring your arguments entirely and asserting that your position is flawed solely by virtue of the fact that you are X demographic category and happen to disagree on an issue with someone of Y demographic category.  

At any rate, there is a lot of variation within any group. Women, for example, have widely differing experiences and perspectives, and you could pick any argument and find some woman to agree with you and some woman to disagree with you. The key, as I already said, is the set of facts, evidence, and reasoning a person's principles and positions are based on.  A person can be well-versed in feminism, gender studies, queer theory, cultural studies, post-colonialism, African American studies, etc. and still reach the conclusion that a vote for a third party or a non-vote is less dangerous for society as a whole, including oppressed sub-groups, than a vote for Clinton. That is not "the privilege to not be afraid" - that is just someone with a similar set of concerns reaching a different conclusion.

Donald Trump is going to destroy society and that fear is more important than anything else.

Clearly it is not possible to say with any certainty what the results of a Donald Trump presidency will be. Personally, I think he is too incompetent to be the next Hitler or Stalin (also, institutional/structural conditions are completely different from Weimar Germany so those comparisons are problematic for other reasons) and based on all available evidence, including the heavy weight of institutional inertia in the U.S. political system, I imagine things would be fairly status quo under Trump. 

People will remind me of the danger that he stirs up racists.  I think those people like to forget that the radical right wing has been stirred up for a while. If anything, enthusiasm for Trump among those elements will wane once he is firmly part of the establishment, and the radical right will continue on. Once again, it will be more productive to reflect on the ways in which establishment discourse on terrorism, immigration, crime, drugs, and so forth, along with policies that create a white underclass, have done their share to stir up the radical right.

Most importantly, it is necessary to reject a politics based on fear. Some of the most terrible decisions are made when people act based on fear. (This even holds beyond humans, as fear is one of the primary causes of aggressive behavior outside of a predator-prey relationship.) That is why politicians always try to stoke people's fears to increase support for wars.  The fact that the agenda of news media has become so completely profit-driven, and that fear draws ratings, has only contributed to an environment in which fear plays an important role, and this environment just so happens to make people and situations much easier for politicians to manipulate.

If we give in to fear, we surely allow ourselves to be manipulated. Instead, we must remain rational, analyze problems at a systemic level, and be brave enough to pursue the actions and changes that we know are necessary.

Material Structure of Ideology and Politics: Part 9

I identified one final ideological-institutional cluster - or, more aptly, micro-cluster. A little further to the left of the Progressive cluster I noticed a very small network of several think tanks (e.g. Institute for Policy Studies and Center for Economic & Policy Research) that I called the Reformist Left. Associated with these institutions are a handful of figures such as Noam Chomsky (academic), Joseph Stiglitz (economist - formerly with World Bank and Clinton's Council of Economic Advisers), Barbara Ehrenreich (journalist), and Mark Weistbrot (economist). As far as I am aware, there is no significant corporate funding or affiliations with politicians, and it is primarily an intellectual domain.

The Reformist Left is more critical of The Establishment than the Progressive cluster, yet not exactly revolutionary either. It is certainly more sweeping and trenchant in its critique of globalization and U.S. foreign relations than the Progressive cluster. It is also incisive, like the Progressive cluster, in its criticism of structural inequalities. The economic position of the Reformist Left is also similar to that of the Progressive Cluster - Keynesianism, though possibly even stronger in its support for unions and public programs.

I chose the word "reformist" to place this ideological position in the context of the longstanding divide between the reformist and revolutionary left. The reformists are often derided by the revolutionary left, especially in Europe where their institutionalization in the form of Social Democrat parties seen as a sell out. Strict revolutionaries, for their part, are criticized as being incapable of enacting any social change. The revolutionary left, I should note, comprises a number of different ideologies, groups, and agendas.

Nothing left of progressivism has ever had much political clout in the United States, although presidential candidate Bernie Sanders (who, it should be noted, is running as a democrat) has apparently been fundraising quite well. From what I can tell, once working class whites in the U.S. overwhelmingly shifted to Liberal-Centrist, Religious Right, and Radical Right positions, the Reformist and revolutionary left remained as the domain of academics, with some non-academic activists of color included. That is not to say that all of academia is leftist, of course; just that a large proportion of leftists in the United States tend to have some connection or other to academia (even just as drop-outs). Therefore, I would place both the Reformist Left and revolutionary left (all its varieties) squarely outside of The Establishment, while noting that the Reformist Left is a little less adversarial to The Establishment.

Material Structure of Ideology and Politics: Part 8

Loosely linked to the Liberal-Centrist cluster is another ideological-institutional cluster that I dubbed Progressive (back to the creative names, I know). It is, perhaps, comparable in size to the Neoconservative cluster. Also, somewhat similarly to the Religious Right, its ideological position seems to be driven primarily by feelings, values, and social issues rather than intellectual purity or well-defined economic or political principles.

Progressives do not seek to radically altar the status quo, but promote values of equality and fairness within the confines of the current system. They want capitalism, but they also want to blunt its sharpest edges and thus tend to opt for a Keynesian form of neoliberalism, often with paired with some support for unions. In the area of foreign policy, they do not object to war per se and are frequently taken by the humanitarian rhetoric produced by the Liberal-Centrist cluster, but they are cautious about military intervention and skeptical of the ends to which such intervention is often directed, generally preferring negotiations and sanctions. Like those in the Liberal-Centrist camp, they are enthusiastic about the ability of science and technology to drive human Progress and are interested in green alternatives. The biggest departure from the Liberal-Centrist cluster is progressives' willingness to identify the structural inequalities at the base of many civil rights issues, and they often advocate deeper changes in this area.

The Progressive cluster consists of think tanks such as the Center for American Progress, the New America Foundation, the Economic Policy Institute, and the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies; advocacy organizations like MoveOn.org; media outlets like Air America, ThinkProgress, American Public Media, The Atlantic, and the Huffington Post; and figures such as Anne-Marie Slaughter, George Soros, Chris Hayes, Christiane Amanpour, Fareed Zakaria, Jimmy Carter, and Robert Reich. Funding comes from some of the same foundations that support Liberal-Centrist institutions (Ford Foundation, MacArthur Foundation, Carnegie Corporation, Pew Charitable Trusts, Rockefeller Foundation), along with others like the Open Society Foundation, Annie E. Casey Foundation, and the Kellogg Foundation. In addition to foundations, support also comes from labor unions, groups like AARP and NAACP, as well as foreign governments.

There is also a good deal of corporate funding of Progressive institutions. The predominant sources are the technology, telecomm, and entertainment industries, with significant support from the financial sector as well. One could surmise that the attitudes and values associated with the type of people in Silicon Valley and Hollywood explain their preference for Progressive institutions. When one hears stories about CEOs limiting their own pay or raising their employee's wages, it is usually a newer technology company of some sort. Furthermore, all three of the former industries have an interest in keeping the purchasing power of most people in the U.S. relatively high, so they can afford to buy their products.

It is possible to cynically view the willingness of Progressive figures and institutions to engage in identity politics as part of a base-unification/mobilization strategy similar to the way the Religious Right represents the Republican Party's cooptation of religious fundamentalists. From this perspective, the Progressive cluster allows an outlet for marginalized groups to express their frustrations with certain forms of oppression without too radically challenging the status quo, and to ultimately channel that frustration into political activity supportive of the Democratic Party (and hence, the status quo). I have not come across much empirical evidence of such overt strategizing, though that is not to say that it doesn't exist. This is an area for me to research further.

One thing is certain, though: after being virtually non-existent for several decades (especially during the Clinton era), the Progressive cluster has not only grown in size but also influence in recent years. Just as there has been a war within the Republican Party, one hears frequent commentary about whether Hillary Clinton will be able to win over the progressive wing of the Democratic Party (represented by Elizabeth Warren). Although, unlike the Republican Party, which has an entire ideological-institutional cluster representing the melding of different ideological positions, the Democratic Party remains substantially aligned with the Liberal-Centrist cluster and it only gets the support of progressives because progressives feel they have no other option and must choose the lesser of two evils (see Nader in 2000 election). Yet, the Progressive influence is strong enough that even an otherwise Liberal-Centrist Establishment media outlet like MSNBC has included voices to cater to progressive social concerns and gives hollow warnings about income inequality and corporate influence in politics.

The Progressive cluster occupies only a small niche within the Establishment, but it will be interesting to see how that position changes as it increases its strength.

Defining The Establishment

Or:  The Material Structure of Ideology and Politics:  Part 7



Of the ideological-institutional clusters I have described so far, Bridge Conservative is the largest. Rivaling Bridge Conservative is another cluster that I am calling Liberal-Centrist. I use the word "liberal" to signify affinity to classic liberalism - primarily a mix of economic liberalism, civil rights, and secularism, embedded within a grand narrative of Progress. Furthermore, Liberal-Centrist ideology corresponds most closely to the mainstream of the Democratic Party, although figures from both parties are prevalent in this cluster. I appended the word "centrist" to clarify that the word "liberal" was not synonymous with "left wing" in this case, as this ideological position is often identified as the center of the political spectrum.

The Liberal-Centrist cluster does not contain any shadowy advocacy groups writing legislation behind closed doors (at least, not that I am aware of), unlike Bridge Conservative; however, the Liberal Centrist cluster does not need this sort of activism to maintain political influence, because it is, more than anything else, The Establishment.

The infrastructure of the Liberal-Centrist cluster consists of highly influential think tanks such as the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment, the RAND Corporation (a think tank created to serve the interests of the Dept. of Defense), and the Council on Foreign Relations, along with advocacy groups such as the controversial National Endowment for Democracy (often accused of meddling in foreign affairs and supporting the overthrow of elected governments). The funding for these institutions comes from large foundations (Ford Foundation, Gates Foundation, Carnegie Corporation, MacArthur Foundation, Pew Charitable Trusts, Rockefeller Foundation, etc.), U.S. government agencies (the Dept. of Defense, USAID, the Federal Reserve, DHHS, etc.), foreign governments, the World Bank and other regional development banks - in other words, the most powerful governmental and financial institutions in the world. Allying with these institutions is an impressive roster of establishment political figures such as Leon Panetta, Madeleine Albright, Henry Kissinger, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, Chuck Hagel, Susan Rice, and Dianne Feinstein (notice all the connections to the State Department), along with equally establishment media outlets like The Washington Post, TIME, Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report, and MSNBC.

The ideology of the Liberal-Centrist cluster differs from Bridge-Conservative more in style than substance. Both are committed to neoliberalism, with Liberal-Centrist advocating some economic controls to ensure stability (and Bridge Conservative professing adherence to strict Friedmanism). Both support militarism (e.g. "stopping ISIS"), though the Liberal-Centrist support is framed in the secular rhetoric of humanitarian intervention and spreading democracy (Bridge Conservative employs more religious framing - good vs evil, etc.). Liberal-Centrist ideology is more amenable to civil rights than Bridge Conservative in theory, though often the commitment to competition, market freedom, and other matters take priority. In other words, Liberal-Centrist figures like to profess the value of protecting and enhancing civil rights - it sounds and feels very nice (whereas it makes many Bridge Conservative figures feel like they're being attacked) - especially as it pertains to other countries, but they are unwilling to make the deep, structural analyses that would allow them to actually do anything effective in that vein. One of the biggest differences between the Liberal-Centrist and Bridge Conservative clusters is that while the latter concerns itself with the assault on traditional values, the former takes a keen interest in technological innovations and "green" alternatives (environmentalism is perhaps the biggest point of departure between the two clusters). Another difference is that Liberal-Centrist ideology is more compatible with international collaboration, foreign aid, and support for transnational organizations, such as the UN, while Bridge Conservative, especially to the extent that the Radical Right and libertarians are influential, is more suspicious of internationalism and foreign aid - even though, in practice, foreign aid and transnational organizations are employed as leverage to further the same economic and political goals abroad.

The Liberal-Centrist cluster also enjoys a wellspring of corporate support. My own research indicates the financial, pharmaceutical, and arms industries to the be the most prevalent private benefactors. The support of the arms industry (which now also provides a variety of other important defense and security services) makes sense, considering that the military/defense/security establishment is embedded within the Liberal-Centrist cluster. Similarly, with the cozy relationship between the Federal Reserve/federal regulators/development bank execs and the financial industry - complete with revolving doors and bailouts - it is not hard to understand that source of support either. And the pharmaceutical industry has had success within The Establishment, writing the portions of the Affordable Care Act relevant to its interests

In some crucial ways, conservative politicians are correct when they align themselves with Main Street and link Democrats/liberals with the interests of Wall Street. It is true that the conservative ideological clusters have more power at state and local levels, hold more sway over teenage boys who've discovered Ayn Rand, blue collar workers who fear the effects of immigration, the 80-year-olds who spend the day watching Fox News, and the religious fundamentalist family next door. It is also true that the Liberal-Centrist agenda is hegemonic and institutionalized at larger - national and transnational - levels. Yet, there is a common substance of support for the ideas and institutions that constitute the global power structure - American hegemony, the military, capitalism, economic growth. In the one case it is packaged in a rhetoric of tradition and religion that resonates more with the wary masses who need something to fight for; in the other, it is packaged in the rhetoric of Enlightenment philosophy and science that appeals to the idealistic technocrats and professionals who work tirelessly within the global power structure to serve "the greater good."

Material Structure of Ideology and Politics: Part 6

Tying together the Religious Right, Neoconservative, and Libertarian clusters is an ideological-institutional cluster that I have termed Bridge Conservative. This is where the heart of the Republican party and major organs of political action lie. I could have dubbed it "Mainstream Conservative" - however, I wanted to emphasize the most important aspect of this cluster: it is not a distinct ideological position in itself, rather a collection of material networks connecting (hence, "Bridge") and bringing together ideas and figures from Religious Right, Neoconservative, and Libertarian clusters - and to some extent even the Radical Right.

The Bridge Conservative cluster consists of numerous think tanks including the Heritage Foundation, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and Citizens Against Government Waste; media outlets such as townhall.com, The American Spectator, the Wall Street Journal, the National Review, and the Fox News Channel; and advocacy groups like Americans for Prosperity, Americans for Tax Reform, and the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC). All of the institutional infrastructure receives financial support from a wide array of corporations and foundations such as the Olin Foundations, the Bradley Foundation, Scaife Foundations, and the Koch Foundation.

What this coalition amounts to, in practice, is a solid foundation of neoliberalism (deregulation, privatization, spending cuts), general flag-waving and fist-shaking in the direction of terrorists and "bad guys" (though exact foreign policy positions vary, with support for intervention more likely when Republicans are in charge), and a good dose of "traditional values" and the White Christian Persecution Complex (one need only look at how gay rights issues are currently being handled by the Republican Party to see variations here as well).

As neoliberalism is the common thread uniting these institutions, neoliberalism accordingly serves as the focal point for political action. Perhaps the most notorious mechanism linking the intellectual world of think tanks to real legislative action is the work of ALEC. It has come to light in recent years how much influence ALEC has exerted at the state level. Ideas become incarnate via model legislation crafted by ALEC, which is then passed on to conservative lawmakers and often introduced word-for-word as bills in state legislatures. ALEC's legislation can predominately be characterized as neoliberal - e.g. Right to Work, opposition to environmental regulations, corporate tax cuts, privatization of education - although some effort goes into maintaining structures of discrimination against people of color (Stand Your Ground, Voter ID. Three Strikes laws, border security).


The extreme neoliberal policies promoted by this activist coalition certainly coincide with the interests of many corporations, and indeed, corporate funding in this arena is not lacking. Perhaps the most prominent source of corporate funding of Bridge Conservative enterprises is the energy industry. Although Exxon, the most profitable corporation in the industry, spreads its money fairly widely across the spectrum, it appears that most of the focus of the industry is on Bridge Conservative institutions. The oil companies certainly benefit from the relaxation of environmental regulations. It is worth noting that other significant contributors to Bridge Conservative causes also abide in existential conflict with government regulations - specifically, the tobacco and pharmaceutical industries. The latter is to some extent impeded by safety regulations, but more importantly, their extraordinary profits depend on a lack of pricing regulations - i.e. their ability to set prices arbitrarily high.

The Bridge Conservative cluster allows for the political collaboration of a variety of individuals and institutions committed to neoliberal orthodoxy, with support from some of the most profitable corporations. It definitely exists within the realm of the Establishment, but it is the next cluster I will discuss that really defines the Establishment.

Material Structure of Ideology and Politics: Part 5

Another ideological-institutional cluster bearing certain similarities to the Neoconservative cluster is the Libertarian cluster. The Libertarian infrastructure is composed of think tanks like the Cato Institute, the Ayn Rand Institute, the Ludwig Von Mises Institute, the Reason Foundation, and the Heartland Institute, along with the advocacy group Americans for Limited Government. Much of this institutional infrastructure has notoriously received financial support from the Koch brothers and their associated organizations.

The parallels between the Libertarian and Neoconservative clusters consist of the facts that both are more intellectually/academically based (though Libertarian much, much more so than Neoconservative) and that both have carved out niches for themselves within the Establishment from which they can exert varying degrees of influence over policy. The similarities end there. While the Neoconservative cluster has religious undertones, the Libertarian cluster is mostly silent on matters of religion (and some people associated with the "libertarian" label are anti-religious, though I will have more to say on the variation momentarily). Secondly, while neoconservativism almost verges on a form of "soft fascism" with its celebration of executive power and military conquest, libertarianism advocates the limiting of all federal government power and is predominately isolationist.

In this way, the political and economic agenda of the Libertarian cluster is nearly identical to that of the Radical Right, so much so that the two are sometimes conflated in popular discourse, and some individuals and groups whose views would more properly be categorized as Radical Right - such as the Tea Party and Gary North (representative of Christian Reconstructionism) - have associations with some Libertarian institutions. As a general rule of thumb, one can characterize the difference been the Libertarian cluster and the Radical Right as a matter of social liberalism vs. social conservativism verging on theocracy (and to a secondary degree, intellectualism vs conspiracy theory-laden populism). There are some figures, such as Ron Paul and Andrew Napolitano, who maintain connections to both the Radical Right and the Libertarian cluster and are difficulty to categorize. Ideologically, both Paul and Napitano are religious and pro-life, but otherwise tend to adopt liberal stances on social issues and advocate separation of church and state. Furthermore, and unsurprisingly given libertarianism's intellectual roots, within the Libertarian cluster there have been splits and schisms, and variations in the degree to which social liberalism is emphasized and affiliations with religious conservatives are tolerated.

Given that the Libertarian ideological-institutional cluster is a key source and exponent of the ideas of economic liberalism - the cornerstone of the Establishment order - the institutions and individuals comprising the Libertarian cluster are in a position of real policy influence and hence occupy a small position within the Establishment. However, the Libertarian opposition to most government functions and most military interventions ensure that its position within the Establishment will never be more than marginal.

Material Structure of Ideology and Politics: Part 4

As promised, the next ideological-institutional cluster that I will be describing is the Neoconservative. Neoconservative figures and organizations received more public awareness after some key neoconservative leaders increased their power in the George W. Bush administration. The Neoconservative cluster consists of think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute, the Hudson Institute, and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs; media like The Weekly Standard; and a glut of significant political figures such as Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, Scooter Libby, Richard Perle, John Bolton, Bill Kristol, and Charles Krauthammer,

Just like the Religious Right, plenty has been written about neoconservativism. From what I can tell, its origin may have been two-pronged. First, it is often noted, and the name "neoconservative" itself derives from the fact, that one source of neoconservativism is former anti-communist liberals who made a conservative turn as a reaction against the New Left. However, it is difficult to see traces of the "liberal" aspects of neoconservative origins as it exists today, and the political clique that I see as the second major source of neoconservativism, who made themselves the ruling faction during the George W. Bush presidency (Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, et al) from what I can tell were never liberal at all.

Neoconservativism, as represented in the ideas and polices of the Rumsfeld Clique, is more intellectually-based (compared to the Radical Right and Religious Right). A number of members of the Rumsfeld Clique were students of, or attended classes at, the University of Chicago and are said to be influenced by the philosopher Leo Strauss. At the same time, most prominent neoconservatives have religious influences, to some extent shared by the Radical Right and Religious Right. While the latter two clusters are composed primarily of fundamentalist Protestants, Catholics, and Mormons, the religious base of neoconservativism appears to be fundamentalist (Zionist) Protestants and conservative (Zionist) Jews. This partial religious affinity may explain some of the associations with the Religious Right (in addition to the strategic aspect discussed in the previous post).

Like the Radical Right, neoconservatives have a clear political/economic agenda, but their political views are diametrically opposed to those of the Radical Right. While the Radical Right remains anti-authoritarian in political matters, neoconservatives idealize a strong executive branch and throughout their political tenure have sought to expand the powers of the branch as much as possible. Neoconservatives also have an interventionist foreign policy, while the Radical Right remains isolationist. In fact, as a strong contrast to the Radical Right, neoconservatives seem to idealize naked power (in the hands of the "right" people, of course) and the use of violence to obtain their ends. In economic matters, on the other hand, the Radical Right and neoconservativism share a neoliberal (supposedly "free market") approach.

After the ultimately disastrous outcome of the Iraq War, neoconservativism lost a lot of political clout and some neoconservatives resigned, under varying circumstances, during the Bush presidency. However, the election of Obama did not result in the complete purging of neoconservatives from the political establishment, and some maintained ties with the State Department (e.g. Robert Kagan and his wife Victoria Nuland). Furthermore, many neoconservatives retain influential positions in think tanks and conservative media outlets. Therefore, while the Neoconservative ideological-institutional cluster no longer wields the power it had a decade or so ago, it still remains an influential faction within the Establishment.

Material Structure of Ideology and Politics: Part 3

Another very conservative ideological-institutional cluster I labeled the Religious Right (yes, I am relying very heavily on existing categorizations). Belonging to the Religious Right are think-tanks such as the Family Research Council, Ethics and Public Policy Center, and the Council for National Policy; advocacy groups like Focus on the Family, the Christian Coalition, and the National Organization for Marriage; and figures such as James Dobson, Pat Robertson, Jerry Falwell, Erik Prince (the founder of Blackwater), and Tony Perkins. Pat Robertson, for his part, is a Christian media mogul whose ventures include the Christian Broadcasting Network and the 700 Club.

There are two notable features of the Religious Right.

First, there is a certain amount of overlap between the Radical Right and the Religious Right, as some of the same religious figures and organizations have affiliations in both clusters (for example, Cleon Skousen and other extremist elements of LDS). In fact, the Radical Right and Religious Right have a shared religious basis: extremist-fundamentalist Protestants, Catholics, and Mormons. The primary difference between the two clusters is that the ideas promoted by the Radical Right contain a very detailed and consistent political/economic vision that is integrated with social-religious beliefs and attitudes, whereas the discourse and activities within the institutions of the Religious Right privilege religious belief and social issues (marriage rights, abortion, etc.), and pay only secondary (if any) attention to political and economic issues, resulting in a degree of diversity in the political/economic positions held among individuals associated with this cluster.

In contrast to the consistently anti-establishment positions of the Radical Right, the second salient feature of the Religious Right is its tenuous relationship to the Establishment. I will be able to more fully flesh out exactly what I mean by "the Establishment" when I finish outlining the other ideological-institutional clusters. For now, I will briefly explain two aspects of this relationship. First, individuals, such as Irving Kristol and Donald Rumsfeld, who are more closely associated with the Neoconservative institutional-ideological cluster (the subject of my next post), which has carved out a space for itself within the Establishment over the past few decades, also maintain secondary affiliations with institutions of the Religious Right. The extent to which this relationship is strategic or based on genuine religious beliefs is hard to guess. However, there is definitely some degree of strategy involved, and the second aspect of the relationship between the Religious Right and the Establishment is, in fact, the history of a strategic alliance.

The history of the creation the Religious Right in the cooptation of religious fundamentalists by the Republican Party is fairly well known, so there is no need to detail it here. The important point that I want to make is that the institutions that were ultimately employed as an instrument of Republican control over a large voting bloc have actually never had more than a thin connection to other conservative ideological-institutional clusters nor that aspect of the Establishment that is shaped by the Republican Party. It was always a purely pragmatic relationship and the ties could easily be severed. (Witness the problems caused for the Republican Party by recent religious freedom bills and the pragmatic rhetorical shifts taken by some Republican politicians.)

It can be concluded, then, that although the Religious Right has perhaps a stronger institutional base than the Radical Right, it is still rather limited, primarily consisting of a handful of think-tanks, religious organizations, and business ventures. The Religious Right may, accordingly, be viewed as more of an outgrowth of a few related religious movements that was exploited for political purposes. This is not, of course, to deny the religiosity of many prominent politicians and societal power-holders. It is to say that their thinking is guided more directly by institutions and ideologies with clear political/economic agendas that may also happen to harmonize with their fundamentalist religious beliefs.

Material Structure of Ideology and Politics: Part 2

Although I find that the use of political spectrum terminology (right/left) often obfuscates more than iit aids discourse, sometimes it's impossible to avoid it entirely. In fact, that is how I mentally organized the ideological-institutional clusters that began to emerge for me. And now, in this series of posts, I will proceed more or less from right to left.

One of the ideological-institutional clusters that was closest to the fringe I termed the Radical Right. Think tanks associated with the Radical Right include the John Birch Society, American Policy Center, and the National Center for Public Policy Research. Also associated with the Radical Right are Rousas Rushdoony (founder of extreme fundamentalist Christian Reconstructionism), Glenn Beck (and other figures from LDS), the Constitution Party, and the Minuteman Project.

From some preliminary investigation, it appears that the Radical Right has its origins in white-supremacist anti-communism, along with the religious fundamentalist politics that emerged in the 1970s. The key concerns of the people and institutions of the Radical Right today are nationalism(/anti-immigration), isolationism, anti-authoritarianism, and religiously-based social conservativism. They extol "small government" principles, but are also suspicious of large corporations, and expense overseas military expeditions. They are also weary of transnational organizations, the UN in particular.

The societal ideal of the Radical Right is best illustrated by the communal concept of The Citadel. http://iiicitadel.com/index.html

As I mentioned earlier, the Radical Right is more of a fringe cluster. The institutional network is thin compared to the more mainstream clusters I will be describing later. Its primary base of support is extremist religious organizations, although its odes to free market principles harmonizes with most other ideological clusters and corporate interests, and an "anti-science" coalition has been forged with such corporations as Phillip Morris, who produce faux research challenging dominant scientific appraisals of the effects of smoking, pollution, etc. The National Center for Public Policy, for example, is devoted to the production of this "alternative" science.

At the same time, the Radical Right's anti-authoritarian and isolationist leanings ensure that more extended relationships with interests inside the political establishment will not develop and its institutional infrastructure will necessarily be limited.

Material Structure of Ideology and Politics

Due to things going on in my life I haven't posted in a really long time. I almost don't feel like I know how to do it anymore!

Also, for some reason, I haven't really felt like I've had much to say. That might mean that I am surrounding myself with too many people/viewpoints that correspond to my own. Maybe I'm even getting lazy because other people can formulate my thoughts for me.

One extraneous thing that I HAVE done is independent/amateur research on think tanks. I've been interested in seeing how the networks of different ideologies and political strategies are institutionally manifested. This is part of my long-term goal of more thoroughly dissecting the structure of power in the modern world. (Parasitically, of course. I will almost always have to rely on the work of others)

My starting point for this little project of mine was come up with a list of U.S. think tanks and then look at:

1) Individual and corporate backing
2) Membership and affilliations
3) Associated media
4) Connections to activist organizations

As I started to putting this information together, I saw that the think tanks on my list clustered into a number of groups sharing some characteristics.

My plan is to describe each group in successive posts.

Stay tuned.

Who Is Privileged: Part 2 (Gender Edition)

In the wake of the killing spree at UCSB, which was perpetrated by a young man who wanted "retribution" for all the girls who refused to date him and have sex with him, there have been numerous conversations about misogyny, fueled by the #yesallwomen trend on Twitter. There has, of course, also been the predictable backlash from the usual chorus of men who try to derail every discussion about the problems women face. What lies at the heart of these men's protests is a fundamental misunderstanding of what sexism, oppression, and privilege really are all about. In my last post I addressed some of these misconceptions, with a particular focus on race and class. Given the things I have heard some men say in the last day or two, I ought to give some attention to gender as well.

To start off, let me acknowledge the fact that, yes, there are aspects of being a man that are undesirable. Ask Jane Feminist and she might tell you that she is glad she can smile and wave at strangers' children without being perceived as a pedophile. She is glad that she looks less inherently suspicious to police or other authorities. She is glad she doesn't have to engage in idiotic displays of masculine bravado (which usually amount to dangerous dares), nor hide her admittedly irrational fear of spiders, if she doesn't want to. She is glad she has never felt compelled to spend lots of money buying things for her dates.

So men have it bad too, and that means feminists are wrong about all that male privilege stuff. ...right? Well, no. I explained in my last post how rough times and bad experiences don't equate to systemic inequality. This is true even when those bad experiences directly relate to one's membership in a specific demographic category. Privilege and oppression come into play only when that category is deemed inferior to or somehow "less than" the other. Furthermore, hierarchy of this sort always has its basis in institutionalized inequality.

If the hardships of being a man are on par with those of being a woman (and therefore a thing called "sexism" doesn't really exist) then why is it that Jane Feminist knew from the time she was a small child that there was something inferior about being a girl? Why did her brother and the neighbor boys with whom she played always place limits on what things she was "allowed" to participate in? Why were girls praised for doing things like boys, while boys were derogated by being compared to girls? Why did Jane feel, until she reached college, like she had to embrace the disadvantages of masculinity anyway (namely, hiding her emotions, acting tough, displaying physical strength) in order to prove that she really wasn't that inferior human being they thought she was? Why did she feel, even through the duration of college, that she always had to prove that she really was intelligent, and didn't get confused by math problems?

In creating a gendered hierarchy we have constructed the male-female divide in a way that is damaging to those at the bottom as well as the top of the hierarchy. Men feel pressure to be athletic, to be successful (in order to provide for a family), to place themselves in danger in times of crisis, and to hide all vulnerability, weaknesses, and emotions. Furthermore, in simultaneously constructing masculinity as inherently violent and aggressive, we urge men to act counter to our general sense of morality in order to "prove themselves." The result is that we cultivate a type of pathological consciousness that is responsible for such societal problems as rape and killing sprees. This is not good. But the reason why men are encouraged to be strong and successful and violent and hide vulnerabilities is because these are the things that required to maintain power in society. These are the things that are needed to uphold one's place at the top of the hierarchy. Therefore, we cannot deny that this hierarchy exists - e.g. that men are held ideologically and institutionally in a position of dominance over women - but we can also recognize that the "bad male experiences" are a form of blowback, which inevitably results from the exercise of power. It is possible to acknowledge that hierarchy exists, while also recognizing that dismantling the hierarchy may have positive consequences for oppressor and oppressed.

There is more to this, though. Men in higher social classes enjoy more freedom from traditional gender stereotypes. A wealthy man may express his enjoyment of the arts, and fail to express interest in beer and sports, more freely than a working-class man. There is a well-documented interplay of class and gender. Working class cultures of any race have been marked by hyper-masculinity (think about hard rock, metal, hip hop, etc.) - as well as, it should be mentioned, an intensification of sexist tropes. It is true that the genres I parenthetically referenced are diverse, and it is actually the specimens that are processed by the corporate world and thrown into the mainstream that most exemplify the hyper-masculinity and sexism. This indicates that the relationship between class and gender is in some degree shaped by corporate interests. There is another, complementary argument to be made that people who are subjugated on the basis of their race and/or class might cling on to the one form of power (masculinity) that is available to them, however superficially. Either way, it is clear that the men who are most burdened by the negative consequences of masculine stereotypes are those who are marginalized on a race or class basis.

It should also be mentioned that, even in cases where the pressures are shared by men and women, there is still an inherent inequality. For example, both men and women are held to pretty narrow and unreasonable standards of how their bodies should look. Yet, there is still an idea, popularized in movies and tv shows, that even when men fail to meet those standards, ultimately they can still "get the girl" as long as they are a decent person (notice all the tv and movie couples where the woman is far more attractive than the man... and in my experience this holds in real life). On the other hand, the cinematic cliché for women is the awkward, nerdy girl who gets a makeover and then is able to get the guy (also, she just happened to have the perfect body from the beginning). We do hold women more strongly to our unreasonable standards than men, and the end result is the high incidence of eating disorders among young women.

Here's another example that relates more directly the UCSB killings. Both men and women experience rejection; they both get their hearts broken. When Jane Feminist is rejected, she kind of wonders why he wasn't interested, kind of tries to convince herself that it wouldn't have worked out anyway, but mostly spends her energy trying to "get over" him. She recognizes that she has not had a lot of successful relationships, and blames it on the fact that she has some emotional issues she needs to deal with. She notices, though, that she often hears men blame women for their lackluster dating record."Girls never go for the nice guys! Those sluts always pick the jerkiest guys and not me! Wahhh!" (And somehow, Jane notices, those self-proclaimed "nice guys" are always the creepiest of all.) Jane is also bothered by the frequency with which men don't take the "hint" (or, the blatant, direct message) and keep persisting, even, sometimes, to the point of stalking or harassing. They are no doubt harboring some false hope provided by all those romantic comedy films where the guy just keeps asking the girl out, and finally she caves in and they fall happily in love. Jane wonders, "Why can't they just accept the fact that we're not interested when we say we're not interested?"

The point is not some sort of contest of Who Has It The Worst. We should all be sympathetic to the things that men have to deal with. The point is that, if we want to make things better for men, it just so happens that our task is the same as if we want to make things better for women: eradicate patriarchy and sexism.

We will all be better off for it.

Who is Privileged?

Lately I have seen a number of discussions that reveal some confusion about the concept of “privilege.” Most commonly, privilege is equated with wealth. Then, there is also the notion, recently expressed by a Princeton undergraduate, that so long as you have a personal or family history that includes some rough times, you need not consider yourself “privileged” in any way, nor must you acknowledge that other people’s experiences are fundamentally different than yours.

The reason why some people are resistant to being characterized as “privileged,” as far as I can tell, is the implication that: a) they did not completely “earn” their successes and therefore do not have any more of a “right” to certain types of power, status, and/or wealth than others; and b) they ought to be more reflective about the assumptions they make as well as more attentive to the perspectives of others (when it’s so much easier not to be either of those things).

The misconception is that privilege is something you either have, or you don’t. People view privilege as a black-and-white, all-or-nothing phenomenon. However, such a narrow view of privilege does not reflect the complexity and multi-dimensionality of our social identities and personal histories. I will admit, without disclosing any information about myself, that there are certain areas where I enjoy a lot of privilege, and other areas where I have none at all.

But let’s back up for a second and look at what privilege actually is. First and foremost, privilege is a characteristic of relationships of inequality. Privilege is about being the beneficiary of such relationships. Privilege is about institutions - legal, educational, economic, political, medical, etc. - that may constrain the lives of certain people based on a group with which they are affiliated.

Most importantly, privilege relates to current conditions - existing inequalities and institutional constraints. History is only important in so far as it serves as the foundation for present-day conditions (as history so often is preserved in current social structures). Hence, personal or group history is not always or necessarily relevant in assessing a person’s privilege. I have often heard people of Irish background make the claim that the discrimination faced by their forebears somehow proves that we’ve all had some difficult times and have had to work to get where we are at, or even that there is nothing spectacularly different about the complaints made by other racial/ethnic groups (i.e. “they have no excuse!”). Likewise, Tal Fortgang insists that because his family endured the Holocaust and had to struggle to “make it” as immigrants, his presence at an elite academic institution is therefore attributable to his character and determination, and not at all to any sort of privilege.

The arguments that I am going to make in reference to Irish Americans will apply to any other similarly situated ethnic groups, but I will discuss American Jews separately as they have a unique history to consider. It is undoubtedly true that people of Irish descent experienced some genuine racism earlier in American history, in an era where Irish were not considered “white” like they are today (although one could argue that they were never treated as property, always had civil rights, and in fact 8 of the signers of the Declaration of Independence were Irish). Yet the Irish are one group of people for whom changing social conditions (including new waves of immigration and recalibration of racial categories) actually served to radically alter their social position. It is clear that, despite the history of discrimination, today Irish Americans do not have to worry about educational achievement gaps, income gaps (in fact, according to the U.S. census bureau the median income of Irish headed households is higher than the national median), bias in the criminal justice system, or geographic segregation. The list of American presidents of Irish descent is quite long, and Irish Americans play a very prominent role in politics. It is clear that historical injustices do not have any bearing on the present-day relationships that Irish Americans have with social institutions and structural inequality.

It is also without question that Jews have faced a lot of discrimination throughout American history, and in contrast to the Irish, are still subject to many negative attitudes and prejudices. I frequently hear paranoid comments about Jews controlling the media or the international financial system, or the world. It is certain that Jews, as they go through their lives, will encounter many nasty comments and stereotypes (if they are particularly unlucky and happen into some White Supremacist Territory they may even fear for their safety), and this will surely impact their self identity and many of their attitudes. Therefore, yes, it is true that an American Jew will never have the same amount or type of privilege that other white Americans enjoy.

Yet, there is privilege nonetheless (for many Jews). However psychologically scarring the experience of prejudice may be, it does not seem to translate into widespread institutional discrimination of the sort that makes it so difficult for Americans of other racial/ethnic groups to attend a school like Princeton. American Jews are not disadvantaged by the educational system; they are not targeted by law enforcement; they are not subject to the type of economic exploitation that would leave a large percentage of them impoverished (to the contrary, the median income of American Jewish households is significantly higher than the national median); and they are not commonly mistaken for drug dealers and thugs. It is unlikely that Tal Fortgang, as he walks the halls of Princeton, will ever be mistaken for a janitor.

If you are a Jew, and grow up in an educated, middle or upper class family (as many, though certainly not all, American Jews do), your ability to achieve educational and economic success is not (normally) institutionally hindered solely by the fact that you are Jewish. Here is where privilege really comes in. Not only will you be starting out in a better place than all those Americans who lack basic economic and cultural resources, but if you happen to have friends and family who are well established in certain professions or educational institutions, your connections will certainly give you greater access to important opportunities than less fortunate Americans. It doesn’t even matter if your friends and family had to work really, really hard to get into that college or that profession. They may have had to work their asses off, but you will still reap the benefits of their success. That is privilege. It is entirely possible to be Jewish - even a Jew with immigrant parents or grandparents - and still have a certain amount of privilege.

Before I move on, I want to make a quick side comment about the Holocaust, only because Tal brought it up. It is undeniable that the Holocaust was an atrocity whose horror extends beyond human comprehension. No one should diminish that or ignore it. Undoubtedly, when one has family members who had to endure the worst that humans could possibly experience, it will leave a profound mark on how one views the world, and even on how one views one’s own existence. This is without question. However, in light of everything discussed above, it is clear that, apart from imparting a certain sort of consciousness, the history of the Holocaust is not embedded in American social institutions, nor does it shape one’s ability to move through various American social spaces. (It is an entirely different story in Europe, however, where neo-Nazi groups have persisted, recently resurged in many places, and even acquired political power in some cases.) To be honest, and as someone with some personal investment in the matter, I do not really appreciate people like Tal using such a horrific event to score points for an unrelated social/political agenda.

I think I’ve said enough about American Jews, though. The issue of privilege extends beyond ethnicity/race/religion, as many people on all sides of the debate have noted. For example, one should take into account social class. I mentioned above that privilege is often held to be synonymous with class or wealth. To this end, I have heard arguments that go something like this: “But, many white people are poor. Being white does not make you privileged.”

Yes, you are (almost, sort of) correct - but not completely correct. It is true that a wealthy white person is far more privileged than an indigent white person. This is obvious (hopefully). However, that does not mean that race is irrelevant. There are many types of privilege that come solely from being identified as “white.” A poor white person may not be treated the same as a wealthy white person by our criminal justice system; but just the same, that poor white person will treated a heck of a lot better than a black or latino person of any income level (just look at stats relating to the proportions of different races in prison, in conjunction with the types of crimes committed, as well as the racial disparities in law enforcement targeting and sentencing for similar types of crimes). Black and latino men are routinely followed and stopped by police and security guards, even when they belong to the upper class. Throughout their lives, poor white people will face fewer negative attitudes and assumptions about their character and intellectual abilities, fewer lowered expectations, than many people of color - from the classroom to the courtroom to the workplace. If a white person of a working-class background is able to work her way into a professional workplace - a gateway into the middle class - she will not be denied promotions and raises, she will not make less per hour, on the basis of the color of her skin, like a person of color very well could.

What all of this amount to is one fact, which really should not be so hard to grasp (and yet it is). Social identities are multifaceted, and people’s relations to different social institutions vary considerably according to which aspects of their identity are important in different situations. Alternatively, one could look at it this way: people take part in a multitude of social relationships, each one of which emphasizes a different aspect of their social identity and, altogether, may place them in completely different positions vis a vis other people or groups. Because privilege is based on these complex and context-dependent relationships, privilege is not an enduring personal trait, but rather a context-specific, heterogenous and malleable indicator of one’s relationship to society.

To be aware of one’s privilege simply means to take account of one’s relationship to society - to social institutions and other people. To “check your privilege” (a phrase which, actually, I do not believe I have ever used and have rarely heard) means to have some awareness of how these social relationships function - to acknowledge how or when you benefit from systems of inequality; to recognize the importance of learning about other people’s experiences; and to understand how, in instances in which an aspect of your identity is tied to a particular power structure, the ideologies and patterns of consciousness that are deployed to sustain that power structure become in embedded in your own thought processes. People on the other side of the inequality are particularly willing and able to assist you with the last two items.

Don’t take offense; be appreciative.

Book Review: Debt: The First 5000 Years

The book Debt: The First 5000 Years by David Graeber was given to me by someone kind of on a whim. Neither of us had any idea what it was. At first glance, it seemed like a very detailed historical account of debt, which might be somewhat interesting, but probably also very dry.

Actually, it is a very detailed history of debt. And the book is very long. However, it turned out to be a book that I could not put down, and the length was well worth the read. The historical detail was interesting and novel. Furthermore, the historical evidence was supplemented by anthropological research (which always makes for a great analysis). Graeber challenged so much conventional wisdom that in 300 and whatever pages, I never found myself thinking, "Yup, read this before" (well, aside from some anthropological concepts/studies that I happen to already be familiar with).

Some common assumptions that Graeber refutes with historical and anthropological evidence:

1. Money has it origins in barter (and debt was the last to appear)

Actually, the real historical sequence (at least so far as the evidence points us) is the reverse. Complicated system for managing debt arose before the existence of any currency. Furthermore, each stage of this "evolution" was accompanied by a profoundly new order of violence. For example, debt arose out of "human economies" (or ritual spheres of exchange) that highlight the incalculability of human life, and serve to create or strengthen social bonds through marriage, exchange of ceremonial objects, and the like. When violence rips people out of their social context (say, through a murder or kidnapping) then the ritual means of payment are used "compensate" the family/village for the loss, even while the use of such payment simultaneously serves as a reminder that the loss can never be repaid, as ritual exchange objects signify the incommensurability of human life rather than serve as its equivalent. Thus, something quite like "debt" emerges.

In the history that Graeber delineates, the development of the phenomenon of debt is inseparable from this type of violence, as well as the history of slavery. In some sense, Graeber sees debt as a perversion of a more fundamental human mentality: I will give things to people in need when I have the means, in the expectation that others will provide for me when I am in need. The nature of the perversion is to remove the expectation from the context of a social bond. Rather than a relation of equality - that of mutual aid - it is an inequality in which one party has recourse to the violence necessary to force the other party reciprocate (even if that "reciprocation" takes the form of slavery).

Similarly, the rise of currency is tied to creation of large state militaries and the building of empires. The return to reliance on metallic currencies, in the early era of capitalism, was also inextricably linked to the slave trade. Graeber also notes that periods where currency predominates are characterized by increased warfare and general social instability. Debt requires a minimum amount of trust and faith in others in order to function. When no such trust exists, one has no choice to but to rely on currency.

2. The state are the market are two independent, often even oppositional, forces.

Graeber's historical evidence indicates that, quite to the contrary, markets actually originated in the state. Throughout history, states have created markets for strategic purposes - for example, as a means of provisioning a large standing army. Only in the Middle East during the Islamic Golden Age were markets able to develop relatively independent of the state. Very precise historical circumstances (conquest of state power by an external nomadic tribe, distance between state centers and commercial fringes, etc.) allowed this to occur. Interestingly, Graeber supplies compelling evidence that the writings and ideas of Adam Smith can be traced back to Middle Eastern scholars of that time period (some of his examples are nearly word-for-word identical to theirs). However, Adam Smith attempts to universalize based on the experiences of a particular group of people whose social life is shaped by very singular historical/social forces.

3. Capitalism is characterized by free markets.

Actually, I have already attacked this idea at length. David Graeber simply provides additional support to the contention that capitalism has, more than anything, limited the freedom of the market.

4. Debt is a sign of moral failing, for states or individuals

On the individual level, Graeber notes that debt is part of the very fabric of our social relationships, for better or worse.. For better, when it exists as an expectation of mutual aid; for worse, when it is backed up by violence.

On the state level, Graeber argues that entire currency systems are literally based on debt (say, the loan made by the Bank of London to the British monarchy). If this debt were ever repaid, the entire system would crumble. For the United States, government debt serves to maintain a vast imperial tribute system, where client states buy U.S. debt, and then wealth is transferred to the U.S. (who remains in possession of a large portion of the world's gold) when the value of the U.S. dollar falls in comparison to gold.

Thus, according to Graeber, debt is not the result of individual or national moral failings, or lack of fiscal responsibility. It is built in to the way our society functions, by which relationships are maintained and managed.

Nevertheless, Graber insists that we are in need of a Jubilee. He says that now is the time to erase all debts, wipe the slate clean, and determine on what sort of moral foundation we would like to rebuild our society.

Men as Rape Victims

I came across this article on Slate today. The subject is a new study that shows that men are victims of rape about as often as women. Even when one factors in all of the rape that occurs in prison, apparently a substantial amount is woman-against-man violence.

I will admit, I have not looked at the study itself in great detail, and I perhaps do not have the skill required to evaluate its merits. Furthermore, I have not found any reporting on the study beyond this Slate article. So there is a possibility that it is flawed.

I do think it is important to consider the results seriously, though. Regardless of what the evidence shows, it is important to have an accurate understanding of the circumstances under which rape occurs (if one wishes to stop it).

That said, I am a little concerned about how the results of this study may be used by those who like to claim that feminists make things up and resort to wild exaggerations to maintain their "victim" status.

Let's ask ourselves: do the results of this study, if true, really prove that men have it "just as bad" as women? That patriarchy is a figment of feminists' imaginations?

Well, first of all, your conclusions will depend on how you understand rape. If rape is merely an outgrowth of uncontrollable sexual desires, then the results of this study indicate that a not-insignificant portion of humanity, male and female alike, is so unable to control its sexual appetites that it cannot but help inflicting violence on fellow humans in order to satisfy primal urges.

Some people do hold such a view of humanity and I don't know that there is anything I can do to convince them (on a blog, at least) otherwise. I have written previously, however, in opposition to the idea of an innate, unchangeable "human nature" that is ultimately unaffected by the forces of society and history.

A more sociologically informed view of rape sees it as an instrument of domination, a manifestation of hierarchy, rather than simply a means of obtaining sexual pleasure. From this perspective, what the results of the recent study would mean is that there are forms of subjugation other than those based on male domination of females, which may be carried out, on a micro level, through sexual assault.

The discussion in the Slate article fails to address any social dimensions other than gender. What we don't know is how class, race, sexual orientation, gender identity, and other social realities factor into this. There is, however, evidence that the oppressed among all of these categories are far more likely to be subject to sexual violence. Therefore, it should not be so shocking that men are raped very often too.

But it should also not be overlooked that this study (once again, if true) undermines some of the key arguments of feminism's detractors. Namely:

1. There's not much we can do about rape, because men just can't control their sexual desires
2. There's not much we can do about rape unless women change the way they dress or how they act at parties
3. There are fundamental, biological differences between men and women
 3.a. Men are naturally aggressive
 3.b. Women are naturally passive, helpless

Obviously, women are just as capable of perpetrating acts of violence and men are just as capable of falling victim to them.

It will be interesting to see what information further research provides.

Myths about Communism and Capitalism

Someone sent me this article, and I think it's worth a read. I believe I have raised some or many of these points in my blog; however, it is nice to get them from someone who can write more eloquently than I can.  

http://www.salon.com/2014/02/02/why_youre_wrong_about_communism_7_huge_misconceptions_about_it_and_capitalism/

Stand Your Ground in Vietnam and Florida

Recently I've been reading Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam by Nick Turse. Turse examines the evidence of countless declassified reports (accessed by the Freedom of Information Act) and eyewitness accounts (the latter of which he even travels around Vietnam to procure) to provide a better understanding of the nature of the war waged in Vietnam. His conclusion: My Lai was the norm. The U.S., along with its Vietnamese allies, was essentially destroying everything in South Vietnam - killing anything, bombing anything, setting fire to anything, bulldozing anything. Now, this does not suprise me at all. I critiqued war, in general, before and have specifically argued against the myths of what war entails.

Still, something struck me.

Turse was describing many of the institutional characteristics that encouraged this destructive behavior - everything from the body count incentive to the ethos of basic training. He mentioned, regarding the latter, the racism that was embedded in the discourse of the military. From the beginning, recruits were told not to think of the Vietnamese as fully human. They habitually used racial epithets to refer to the Vietnamese people. Still, though, at this point, nothing surprising. I have written before about the way in which racism is inherently linked to warefare.

Turse went on to describe how civilian deaths were justified. First, there was an exhaustive (and contradictory!) list of behaviors that marked a person as "the enemy": say, running away, or staying still, or making eye contact, or not making eye contact. The list was so comprehensive, in fact, that any behaviors a civilian exhibited prior to being killed would invariably be on the list. So, you could always classify a civilian as an "enemy."

Sometimes, though, trigger-happy individuals were looked upon with some suspicion. For example, they said they had 10 enemy kills, but no recovered weapons. How likely was it that it was really the enemy?

Apparently, Stand Your Ground logic could be applied. One could say that they thought they heard gun shots, and they were just acting in self-defense. (Actually, the list of enemy behaviors also fit into this logic, because one could claim that those behaviors led them to believe they were being ambushed by the enemy, and therefore they were acting in self-defense.)

This is what struck me: the similarity of the logic employed in Vietnam and in Stand Your Ground laws.

1. You can kill an innocent person if you are acting in self-defense.
2. You are acting in self-defense if you are legitimately afraid for your life.
3. Your fear may be legitimized by a set of behaviors (real or imagined) that, when applied to a specific racial group, is supposed to indicate likely impending aggression.
4. But really, you can kill an innocent person because that person is deemed to be less human according to their race; the justification above is just for mental solace.

If you are Vietnamese, running away in fear from helicopters is a sign that you are Viet Cong and therefore you must be killed. If you are a black Floridian, walking through a neighborhood in the evening with a hoody on is a sign that you are a murderous criminal and therefore you must be killed.

Once again, there is a strong link between violence and racism. Violence is facilitated by dehumanization of victims. And dehumanization precipates violence.

"States' Rights" - the Refuge of Racism

With the recent success of the Tea Party and resurgent popularity of Ayn Rand and libertarianism, I think it is useful to trace the history of these strains of thought, as embedded in the "states' rights" discourse. It is important to remember how particular constellations of conservative thought have been shaped by race related issues since the founding of United States. It is too easy to become seduced by the myth that these debates have centered around abstract, noble considerations of individual rights and protection from tyranny. In fact, the debates have always been grounded in very practical concerns about race.

Some of the Founding Fathers were famously uneasy about the issue of slavery, believing it to be cruel and inhumane, even while continuing to own slaves themselves. There was strong opposition to slavery, to varying degrees, from different quarters. Hence, there was a real concern among slave owners that, if the Constitution were ratified, or if the federal government were strong, the abolition of slavery could easily enter into the Constitution. Now, of course, there were other concerns, one of which related to the economic relationship among states. However, that economic system was founded on slavery. The history of race in America has always been entangled in economic concerns, and that is important to this day.

Up until the time of the Civil War and beyond, the South united under the slogan of States' Rights. Resentment toward federal government intervention was particularly salient during the Reconstruction Era. Jim Crow seemed to be a nice way around many of these meddling regulations. ...Until the liberal activist Supreme Court screwed everything up by mandating the desegregation of schools.

It was this desegregation issue that fueled the States' Rights movement for decades. The Republican Party as Americans know it today (or, at least until it started to disintegrate as of late) and the Religious Right that formed its most loyal and important base both took shape in the 1970s. Once again, there were issues fairly unrelated to race that concerned Evangelicals: feminism, sexual liberation, social unrest, etc. Yet, it was the desegregation issue that ultimately spurred them to action. Religious schools were told that they would lose their tax-exempt status if they were segregated. And boom, the Religious Right is formed.

Lately there has been a shift in the Evangelical community, with the younger generation becoming more focused on social justice than social issues. The biggest detractors of "Big Government" are now often more libertarian in orientation. They are worried about all of the taxpayer money being spent on entitlements and social services. They want to cut spending and balance the budget. On the face of it, this seems purely economic. However, examine the discourse a bit, and it is not hard to find racially loaded words and images, playing on the correlation between race and poverty. Tea Party gatherings are no stranger to overt, blatant racism. There is a fear that lazy black and brown (illegal immigrants) people are living high off the hog on the taxpayers' hard-earned money.

And then there is good old fashioned re-imposing racially biased voting laws.

Unfortunately, it seems States' Rights has had less to do with upholding individual dignity than reinforcing a racial caste system.

The Conservative Life and Death of Obamacare

I never did write a second series of post on health. However, I think it's about time I said something about the Affordable Care Act, aka Obamacare, aka the Socialist Scourge of the Earth.

Let's start with the obvious: Obamacare is not socialist. Yes, it involves government regulations and mandates, but last time I checked, that is not the definition of socialism. From what contact I have with them, I often see the undereducated folks from Real America and brainwashed Tea Party ideologues complain about the imposition of a "national healthcare plan" to accomplish the goal of making sure every American has access to health care. Apparently, they think that Obamacare is a public health insurance plan. They may have forgotten, or never realized, that Obama was forced to drop his public option from the ACA. So no, sadly, Obamacare is not a public option, does not contain a public option... and as has now become clear, never will have anything to do with a public option.

Now, one could argue that increasing government regulations and mandates equates to socialism. Then, of course, they are going to have to try to explain how to clearly distinguish socialism from capitalism when the difference is only a matter of degree, with no clear dividing line. The truth of the matter is, many of the provisions of Obamacare were dreamed up by conservatives. A republican governer (Romney, former republican presidential candidate) employed a version of the law in Massachusetts, and was heavily supported by conversatives activists and think tanks, like the Heritage Foundation. Obamacare is a conservative idea.

Furthermore, the ACA depends on and works through private insurance companies. Insurance companies have helped write the law and develop the national health exchange. Insurance companies also stand to benefit from the increased coverage, especially that of healthy young adults (who are now penalized for not having insurance).

Simply put, the ACA is an idea conceived in conservative circles and given flesh by private corporations. It is about the furthest thing from socialism I can possibly think of.

For these reasons, also, Obamacare is largely crap.

Yes, it makes somes attempts to cut costs (mostly in order to pay for itself, not to make health care more affordable, as the name of the law implies). Yes, it provides subsidies to some people who will better be able to afford insurance. Yes, it allows young adults the option to stay on their parents' insurance a little longer. Yes, it has gotten rid of pre-existing conditions restrictions. Etc.

This will undoubtedly be very helpful to a few people.

But it does nothing to address the exorbintantly high cost of health care (which is the main problem with the U.S. health care system), caused mainly by: 1) price gauging by hospitals, medical device manufacturers, and pharmaceuticals (the provision to allow Medicare to negotiate drug prices was stripped from ACA, as was the public option, both of which could have addressed price gauging by competetive downward pressure); 2) High overhead/beaurocratic costs (increasing the complexity of the insurance marketplace will only make this worse); and 3) Over-use of treatments and medications.

The last point, in particular, is a sensitive one .Americans, saturated as they are in the "rugged individualist" mentality, completely blind to the effects individual actions have on the rest of society, insist on their right to opt for whatever absurd, costly, and unnecessary treatments they want. "No one is going to tell me what treatment I need!" And then, of course, we like to sue medical care providers when they are not able to work miracles. All of this results in an over-reliance on expensive diagnostic imaging, over-prescription of antibiotics, and the like. In addition to conbributing to the rise of antibiotic resistant superbugs, this dramatically increases the cost of medical care for everyone. The poorest of society are harmed the most, of course. And since ill health follows lines of political/economic/social marginalization, the poorest are often most in need of this expensive care that they can't afford.

So, as nice as it might sound to have the "freedom" to keep your 97-year-old father on life support for another 2 weeks, because you are emotionally incapable of dealing with the inevitability of death, that "freedom" comes at the direct expense of poor people who have their whole lives ahead of them.

'Murrica.

Liberation Rhetoric: Of Robin Thicke and Syria

Due to my recent busy schedule, I haven’t had time for writing. So, I realize my delay in drafting this post puts me a little behind, at least as far as Robin Thicke is concerned. Well, he’s still popular so maybe not.

The first time I heard Blurred Lines, I was flipping through radio stations while driving around in another state. I listened for a minute, trying to determine exactly which song it reminded me of (later on realized it was Marvin Gaye’s Got to Give It Up), but as soon as I heard the lyrics, “Let me liberate you,” I gave up and changed the station.

As it turned out, there were many other reasons why the lyrics to this song were offensive. Then there’s the music video, which generated perhaps the most controversy of all. However, to this day, I remain most bothered on a visceral level by the lyrics, “Let me liberate you.” Hopefully I don’t need to explain why. But just in case, here is my begrudging (shouldn’t need to do this) half-assed summary: 1) Men don’t liberate women, women liberate themselves; and 2) Liberation is not tantamount to acquiescing to men’s sexual desires, just as not consenting isn’t a manifestation of oppression. If a woman doesn’t want to, that does not mean she needs to be “liberated.”

Both of these principles have broader application, as the idea of “liberation” has been employed as a justification for domination in a variety of domains. I have already written about its function in the colonial enterprise (link). I have also discussed the continuation of its use in the logic of humanitarian interventions (aka humanitarian imperialism). Want to invade a country? Come up with a reason why the people need to be liberated. Considering all the many negative consequences of the global capitalism, it’s never hard.

We see it playing out once again in Syria. Syria has been on the U.S. “kill list” for more than decade. Finally, there is an opportunity to exploit a mild, short-lived protest movement and transform it into national upheaval (to change the regional balance of power). Of course, Saudi Arabia and other external participants get more of the credit for this role. Still, the American people are told now that we have to bomb Syria in order to save the people from chemical weapons attacks. As of now, the plans are on hold, but I would not be surprised if the U.S. becomes dissatisfied with the efforts of the Syrian regime to hand over their weapons.

Obviously, the most effective discursive elements are able to circulate widely and quickly in multiple domains. And we tend to draw on pre-formed discourses to from other areas to form arguments in new domains. However, as the “liberation” rhetoric is so thoroughly enmeshed in a particular mode of domination, it brings sharp relief to the way in which that mechanism of power itself operates in seemingly different circumstances. In other words, if one wishes to understand the inviolable connection between patriarchy and imperialism, critically examining the role of “liberation” rhetoric is not a bad place to start.

The Soft Sexism of Women's Empowerment

Confession: I tune out whenever anyone mentions “women’s empowerment” as a solution to Third World problems. Before I tune out, I roll my eyes and sigh. And I am a feminist.

If you've had any involvement in human rights circles you will be familiar with the idea: empower women – give them an education or a microloan or whatever constitutes empowerment – and they will “fix” poverty. However, the belief that women are the key to human progress is not new, and it is not feminist. In fact, it has always been essential to the functioning modern patriarchy – that is, patriarchy in fortified imperialist/racist form. More than that, this belief is the most insidious element of patriarchal ideology, because it only superficially, and very disingenuously, values women.

Consider, for example, the American women's rights movement in the Reconstruction Era. White women were encouraged to stay home and raise children to fulfill their role as guardians of the White Race. The suffragists did not want to stay home and have tons of babies, but they happily accepted the fact that they would further the progress of their race. They insisted that voting rights for women was the only antidote to the impending peril of the Black Vote. White women, they argued, were educated and enlightened, and they outnumbered all of the uncivilized blacks and immigrants who would be tarnishing every election from here on out. White women could properly serve their function as guardians of the race only if they had the right to vote. Sadly, in constructing their argument on the basis of the Woman Savior, the suffragists merely strengthened the sexist and racist ideological framework that was instrumental in their oppression.

Of course, there is also a long history of using "women's liberation" as a pretext for imperial conquest. This may be even more pertinent to discussions about the developing world, particularly coming from the propaganda mills of powerful NGOs.

When a child has a crappy role in a school play, you make her feel better by telling her that, even though she doesn't have any lines, it is actually the most important, super special part in the play. Guardianship of the race (/humanity) works in pretty much the same way. Women have to clean up all the messes caused by capitalism, and they are told it is an honor. Whatever society as a whole used to provide, women now have the responsibility of taking care of as best they can on their own.

Valuing women does not mean forcing the entire burden of human progress onto their shoulders. It is not women’s job to fix poverty. As far as I can tell, men created the problem, so why should women have to solve it alone? I have heard, in the context of microloans, that men can’t be trusted because they waste money on alcohol and they don’t care as much about their families. Although I can’t prove that this is an exaggeration born out of Western ideas about masculinity, I can still ask: don't we want to raise the bar for men a little bit? Are the women supposed to do all the work of lifting their families out of poverty while the men drink themselves into oblivion?

But the larger issue is this: the responsibility for “fixing” poverty does not lie with any individual poor people, male or female. Poverty and inequality must be treated as a global systemic problem, one that involves a complex network of transnational social relations manipulated by a handful of people with incomprehensible amounts of wealth. It must be confronted en masse. A few individuals may be able to raise their standards of living with a good education or a loan, but poverty will continue to exist on the same scale until enough people, men and women, decide that they are not going to put up any longer with the capitalist system that creates it.